Inappropriate Renderings:  The Danger of Reductionist Resolutions by Cerone, John
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 33 | Issue 2 Article 11
2008
Inappropriate Renderings: The Danger of
Reductionist Resolutions
John Cerone
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
John Cerone, Inappropriate Renderings: The Danger of Reductionist Resolutions, 33 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2008).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol33/iss2/11
INAPPROPRIATE RENDERINGS: THE 
DANGER OF REDUCTIONIST RESOLUTIONS 
John Cerone* 
INTRODUCTION 
n September 2007, major international news outlets reported that 
“al-Qaeda in Iraq” had offered a reward for the murder of a Swedish 
cartoonist who had drawn the Prophet Muhammad’s head on a dog’s 
body.1 Western media cast the incident as an assault on the freedom of 
expression launched by religiously motivated fanatics, as has been the 
pattern in reporting recent similar incidents. A stark contrast is portrayed 
between the open rational discourse that Western media see themselves 
as fostering on the one side and those who claim that their belief systems 
demand suppression of any expression they find blasphemous or other-
wise unacceptably offensive on the other. 
Since the Danish cartoon controversy first grabbed the international 
spotlight in early 2006,2 the media has reported on hostile or anticipated 
hostile responses from Muslim individuals and groups to various forms 
of expression, including a speech by Pope Benedict,3 the honoring of 
Salman Rushdie,4 and the cancellation of a German opera due to security 
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 1. See, e.g., Bounty Set Over Prophet Cartoon, BBC NEWS, Sept. 15, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6996553.stm; Louise Nordstrom, Artist Displays 
Muhammad Cartoon Despite Al-Qaida Threat; Leader of Terror Group Offers Reward 
for Killing Vilks, Paper’s Editor, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 19, 2007, at 35. For further back-
ground on the Danish cartoon controversy, see John Cerone, The Danish Cartoon Con-
troversy & the International Regulation of Expression, ASIL INSIGHT, Feb. 7, 2006, 
http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/02/insights060207.html. 
 2. The Danish cartoon controversy stems from the September 30, 2005 issue of Jyl-
lands-Posten, a Danish newspaper. This issue contained an article entitled Muhammeds 
Ansigt (The Face of Mohammed), and it was accompanied by twelve cartoons depicting 
the prophet Mohammed in various fashions. Flemming Rose, Muhammeds ansigt [The 
Face of Mohammed], JYLLANDS-POSTEN (Den.), Sept. 30, 2005, at KulturWeekend 3. 
This publication outraged both Muslim and non-Muslim communities worldwide. See 
also Stéphanie Lagoutte, The Cartoon Controversy in Context: Analyzing the Decision 
Not to Prosecute Under Danish Law, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 379, 381 (2008). 
 3. Muslim Anger Grows at Pope Speech, BBC NEWS, Sept. 15, 2006, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5347876.stm. 
 4. Rushdie Title ‘May Spark Attacks’, BBC NEWS, June 18, 2007, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6763119.stm. 
I 
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concerns.5 Despite attempts to cultivate a more nuanced understanding of 
these phenomena, they continue to be illustrated in broad strokes that 
reduce any discussion to a confrontation between competing values 
backed by different camps with increasingly entrenched positions. 
In response to the flare-up over the dog cartoon, the Swedish govern-
ment immediately moved to ease tensions by expressing “regret” and 
meeting with relevant foreign diplomats and other concerned groups.6 
While this prompt action seems to indicate that the Swedish government 
learned something from the Danish government’s diplomatic failures a 
year earlier, the articulation of the underlying issues remains muddled. 
As a spokeswoman for the Swedish Foreign Ministry stated, “[w]e can’t 
apologise for the cartoons because we did not publish them.”7 She noted 
that the government could not influence the publication of such cartoons 
because of rules concerning media freedom in the country,8 echoing the 
Danish government’s response to the earlier controversy.9 
The Human Rights Council has adopted a very different, but equally 
unsatisfactory, approach. On March 30, 2007, during its fourth Regular 
Session, the council adopted a resolution condemning “religious defama-
tion” as a human rights violation.10 In contrast to the Scandinavian gov-
ernment’s elevation of the freedom of expression, the approach mani-
fested in this instrument is the primacy of religious conviction resonating 
within the freedom of religion. 
The two positions, both purportedly rooted in a system of theoretically 
universal values, seem diametrically opposed, thus raising at least the 
specter of incoherence and, more seriously, an outright rejection of the 
notion of common humanity. Yet a closer examination of the relevant 
rules of human rights law reveals that neither of these extreme positions 
flows naturally from the wellspring of fundamental human rights. Al-
though the corpus of international human rights law is far from a perfect 
                                                                                                             
 5. Beheaded Prophet Opera Dropped, BBC NEWS, Sept. 26, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/5382554.stm. The opera was ultimately re-
scheduled and performed a few months later. George Jahn, Berlin Opera Re-Stages 
‘Idomeneo’, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/12/18/AR2006121800917.html. 
 6. Sweden ‘Regrets’ Prophet Cartoon, BBC NEWS, Aug. 31, 2007, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6972093.stm. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Danish Firm Seeks Muslim Row End, BBC NEWS, Jan. 28, 2006, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4656664.stm. 
 10. United Nations [U.N.] Human Rights Council, Report to the General Assembly on 
the Fourth Session of the Human Rights Council, G.A. Res. 4/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/123 
(Mar. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Human Rights Council Resolution]. 
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system, it provides a framework for articulating the full range of underly-
ing issues. Ultimately, such examination can lead to a more satisfactory 
spectrum of responses to the problems that have arisen. 
I. BEYOND ABSTENTION: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 
EXPRESSION 
International human rights law imposes an array of obligations on 
states in relation to the expression of individuals and groups. The norms 
constituting this array range from obligations of abstention, requiring the 
state to refrain from interfering with the freedom of expression, to posi-
tive obligations, including the obligation to criminally punish certain 
types of expression.11 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)12 
and the principal regional human rights treaties13 all require state parties 
to protect freedom of expression. Article 19(2) of the ICCPR proclaims 
that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas 
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in 
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”14 At the same 
time, these treaties contain limitation clauses, recognizing the right of the 
state to impose restrictions on that freedom.15 The jurisprudence of hu-
man rights bodies has distinguished various types of expression, provid-
ing different levels of protection for each.16 
                                                                                                             
 11. All of the rules discussed in this Section have their basis in human rights treaties, 
though some may have also acquired the status of customary law. The resulting frame-
work of rules, drawing as it does from a number of separately negotiated treaties, is not 
necessarily coherent. Human rights bodies, conscious of this issue, have attempted to 
harmonize the different treaty regimes. See, e.g., Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) at 22 (1994) (“Denmark’s obligations under Article 10 (art. 10) must be inter-
preted, to the extent possible, so as to be reconcilable with its obligations under the UN 
Convention.”). 
 12. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.19, opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 13. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms art.10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]; American Convention 
on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 9(2), June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter ACHPR]. 
 14. ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 19(2). 
 15. ECHR, supra note 13, art. 10(2); ACHR, supra note 13, art. 13(2); ACHPR, su-
pra note 13, art. 9(2). 
 16. See, e.g., Feldek v. Slovakia, 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 87, 106; Otto-Preminger 
Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17–18 (1994); Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 
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However, human rights law also contains rules requiring the suppres-
sion of expression. As opposed to the limitation clauses indicated above, 
which permit, but do not require, state parties to limit the freedom of ex-
pression, rules such as those set forth in article 20 of the ICCPR impose 
obligations to prohibit certain types of expression.17 Article 20 requires 
parties to “prohibit[] by law,” inter alia, “[a]ny advocacy of national, ra-
cial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hos-
tility or violence . . . .”18 Similarly, the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) requires parties to “con-
demn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or 
theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or 
ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and 
discrimination in any form.”19 In particular, it obliges parties to criminal-
ize “dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incite-
ment to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement 
to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or 
ethnic origin,” as well as participation in “propaganda activities, which 
promote and incite racial discrimination.”20 One particular type of ex-
pression has been singled out for the strongest suppression obligation. 
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (“Genocide Convention”) obliges all states to criminalize, 
prosecute, and punish the international crime of incitement to genocide.21 
In light of this spectrum of obligations relating to expression, it goes 
without saying that compliance with human rights standards in this arena 
cannot be reduced to obligations of abstention. At a minimum, states 
cannot claim that human rights law constitutes an impenetrable barrier to 
the regulation of expression. 
While the examples surveyed in the Introduction to this Article would 
not constitute incitement to genocide, they may implicate other human 
                                                                                                             
239 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1992); Muller v. Switzerland, 133 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
at 19 (1988). 
 17. ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 20. 
     18.  Id. 
 19. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion art. 4, Dec. 12, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 3, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has held that the rules enshrined in the Genocide 
Convention have acquired the status of customary international law, binding all states. 
Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28). 
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rights standards, such as the freedom of religion and the principle of 
nondiscrimination. 
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
As noted above, each treaty that sets forth the freedom of expression 
also contains a limitation clause. For example, article 19(3) of the ICCPR 
expressly permits parties to impose restrictions on the exercise of the 
right to freedom of expression.22 However, article 19(3) also limits the 
type and scope of permissible restriction. In order to be valid under arti-
cle 19(3), a given restriction must be “provided by law” and must be 
“necessary” to achieve certain purposes.23 These purposes include re-
specting “the rights or reputations of others” and “the protection of na-
tional security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or 
morals.”24 The principal regional human rights treaties contain analogous 
provisions.25 
Human rights bodies mandated to oversee compliance with these trea-
ties have grappled with a number of cases in which states have sup-
pressed expression deemed to be discriminatory, blasphemous, or other-
wise offensive to a religious community. In some cases the suppression 
was found to violate the freedom of expression, in other cases the sup-
pression was deemed a permissible limitation, and in at least one case, 
the expression was held to be ineligible for protection under the relevant 
treaty. 
A. The Human Rights Committee 
The Human Rights Committee, the treaty-body mandated to monitor 
implementation of the ICCPR, has issued general comments on articles 
19 and 20, elaborating its views on the content of the obligations set forth 
therein.26 In its General Comment No. 11, the committee noted that the 
article 20 obligations to prohibit certain forms of expression “are fully 
compatible with the right of freedom of expression as contained in article 
19, the exercise of which carries with it special duties and responsibili-
ties.”27 The committee also opined that states should enact a law “making 
                                                                                                             
 22. ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 19(3). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See supra note 13 and authorities cited therein. 
    26.  U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 11: Prohibition of Propaganda for 
War and Inciting National, Racial or Religious Hatred (Arts. 19–20) at 12, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (July 29, 1983). 
 27. Id. art. 20. 
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it clear that propaganda and advocacy as described therein are contrary to 
public policy and providing for an appropriate sanction in case of viola-
tion.”28 The jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee in individual 
cases has provided further insight into its view of the interaction between 
the freedom of expression and the rights of others.29 
Early on, the committee found that certain types of expression may be 
removed from the ambit of protection provided by article 19 by the op-
eration of article 20. In the case of J.R.T. & the W.G. Party v. Canada, 
the committee found a criminal prosecution for hate speech to be com-
patible with the ICCPR.30 It opined that the petitioner’s public dissemina-
tion of anti-Semitic views fell within article 20 and was thus ineligible 
for protection under article 19.31 While the committee’s views in this 
case give some indication of the limits of article 19, its brief analysis of-
fers little guidance on the relationship between the freedom of expression 
and the obligation to prevent discrimination. 
A decade later, the committee had the opportunity to consider this is-
sue in greater depth in the context of a Holocaust denial case. In Fauris-
son v. France, the complainant alleged that his conviction under French 
law for contesting the existence of the Holocaust constituted a violation 
of his freedom of expression.32 In concluding that the ICCPR had not 
been violated, the Human Rights Committee considered a number of fac-
tors, including the broader social context in which the expression was 
made.33 The committee noted, in particular, the statement of the French 
government that “characterized the denial of the existence of the Holo-
caust as the principal vehicle for anti-Semitism.” 34As such, the prosecu-
tion was justified as “necessary” within the meaning of article 19(3).35 
                                                                                                             
 28. Id. 
 29. The jurisprudence of the committee takes the form of “views” expressed in re-
sponse to petitions from individuals alleging violations of the ICCPR by State parties to 
its first Optional Protocol (“OP”). See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights art. 5, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302. 
 30. J.R.T. & the W.G. Party v. Canada, ¶ 8(b), U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/18/D/104/1981 (declared inadmissible Apr. 6, 1983). 
 31. Id. The committee’s failure to test this restriction of expression against the re-
quirements of art. 19(3) was criticized by commentators. See, e.g., MANFRED NOWAK, 
U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 367–36 (N.P. 
Engel 1993). In recent years, the practice of the Human Rights Committee has been to 
consider any state interference with expression as a potential violation of freedom of 
expression, and thus to examine the restriction under article 19(3). 
 32. Faurisson v. France, ¶ 2.1, U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/ 
D/550/1993 (1996). 
    33.  Id. ¶ 9.6. 
 34. Id. ¶ 9.7. 
 35. Id. 
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In both cases, the committee found restrictions on the freedom of ex-
pression to be compatible with the ICCPR because they were directed 
toward protecting a group from discrimination. The committee also dem-
onstrated, in the context of the Faurisson case, the importance of consid-
ering the broader context in which the relevant expression was made. 
The importance of this contextual factor is similarly reflected in the ju-
risprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 
B. The European Court of Human Rights 
Of all international human rights mechanisms, the institutions estab-
lished under the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”)36 have produced the most 
extensive freedom of expression jurisprudence. Although the European 
Convention formally applies only to Council of Europe Member States,37 
its provisions closely resemble the provisions of the ICCPR. Thus, deci-
sions of the European Court of Human Rights, as authoritative interpreta-
tions of comparable provisions by an international judicial body, provide 
persuasive guidance in the interpretation of the ICCPR and may also 
contribute to the development of customary law standards.38 
Article 10 of the ECHR closely resembles article 19 of the ICCPR. Ar-
ticle 10 expressly provides for the right to freedom of expression, and 
then qualifies this right with a limitation clause.39 Unlike the ICCPR, 
however, the ECHR contains no provision expressly requiring state par-
ties to prohibit certain types of expression. Nonetheless, it does contain a 
provision that has been interpreted to exclude certain types of expression 
from protection. Article 17 of the ECHR states: 
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform 
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set 
forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for 
in the Convention. 40 
Although rarely invoked as an express basis for justifying interference 
with freedom of expression, the court has acknowledged that, pursuant to 
article 17, remarks directed against the ECHR’s underlying values “could 
                                                                                                             
 36. ECHR, supra note 13. The ECHR entered into force in 1953 and serves as a su-
pranational system for the protection of human rights in Europe. 
    37.  Id. art 1.  
    38.   See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 102–103 (1987) (the 
judgments and opinions of international judicial tribunals as to the meaning of interna-
tional agreements are accorded substantial weight). 
 39. ECHR, supra note 13, art. 10(2). 
 40. ECHR, supra note 13, art. 17. 
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not be allowed to enjoy the protection afforded under Article 10.”41 In 
particular, it has held that “there is a ‘category of clearly established 
historical facts—such as the Holocaust—whose negation or revision 
would be removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17.’”42 
In Garaudy v. France, the court rejected as inadmissible the appli-
cant’s claim that his prosecution for Holocaust denial violated article 10 
of the ECHR.43 The court found that the applicant, in the book upon 
which his prosecution was based, “systematically denied the crimes 
against humanity perpetrated by the Nazis against the Jewish 
community.”44 The court found that “in accordance with Article 17 of the 
Convention,”45 such expression was ineligible for protection under article 
10, and it dispensed with its usual analysis under article 10’s limitation 
clause. 46 
Nonetheless, in excluding Holocaust denial from the protection of the 
ECHR, the court relied on many of the factors that would typically be 
employed in such an analysis. It noted that Holocaust denial was one of 
the most serious forms of incitement to hatred of Jewish people, that it 
infringes the rights of others, and that it constitutes a serious threat to 
public order.47 In any event, the court has only exceptionally adopted this 
                                                                                                             
 41. See Lehideux & Isorni v. France, 92 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2864, 2886 (1998) (citation 
omitted). The court stated that “there is no doubt that, like any other remark directed 
against the Convention’s underlying values, the justification of a pro-Nazi policy could 
not be allowed to enjoy the protection afforded by Article 10.” Id. See also Eur. Consult. 
Ass., Recommendation No. R. (97) 20 of the Comm. of Ministers, Principle 4 (Oct. 30, 
1997). This recommendation states that: 
National law and practice should bear in mind that specific instances of hate 
speech may be so insulting to individuals or groups as not to enjoy the level of 
protection afforded by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights to other forms of protection. This is the case where hate speech is aimed 
at the destruction of the rights and freedoms laid down in the Convention or at 
their limitation to a greater extent than provided therein. 
Id. 
 42. Garaudy v. France, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 369, 396 (quoting Lehideux & Isorni, 
92 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2884). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 397. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. The court stated that: 
Denying crimes against humanity is therefore one of the most serious forms of 
racial defamation of Jews and of incitement to hatred of them. The denial or 
rewriting of this type of historical fact undermines the values on which the fight 
against racism and anti-Semitism are based and constitutes a serious threat to 
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approach of excluding expression from the protection of the ECHR. In-
deed, this appears to be the only case in which the court has relied on 
article 17 in its ratio decidendi for rejecting a freedom of expression 
claim. This is likely a consequence of the unique significance of the 
Holocaust in European history and is thus part of the broader social con-
text against which the limits of free expression in Europe are tested. 
This exceptional use of article 17 must also be viewed against the 
backdrop of the otherwise lofty status the court accords to article 10. The 
court has consistently held that “freedom of expression, as secured in 
paragraph 1 of Article 10, constitutes one of the essential foundations of 
a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and 
for each individual’s self-fulfilment.”48 It has further found that, subject 
to the limitations of article 10(2), this freedom is “applicable not only to 
‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inof-
fensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock 
or disturb.”49 Therefore, the offensive character of a given expression 
cannot itself justify suppression unless it can be subsumed under one of 
the grounds for limitation set forth in article 10(2).50 
Thus, apart from the example of Holocaust denial mentioned above, 
the court analyzes restrictions on virtually any other type of expression 
for compliance with article 10’s limitation clause.51 Article 10(2) states: 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and re-
sponsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restric-
tions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a de-
mocratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protec-
tion of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of 
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confi-
                                                                                                             
public order. Such acts are incompatible with democracy and human rights be-
cause they infringe the rights of others. Their proponents indisputably have de-
signs that fall into the category of aims prohibited by Article 17 of the Conven-
tion. 
Id. 
 48. Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1986). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 18. 
 51. For example, even in cases where the expression at issue was deemed by the court 
to amount to an “appeal to bloody revenge,” the court did not apply article 17 of the 
European Convention, but instead analyzed the restriction under article 10(2). See Surek 
v. Turkey (No. 1), 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 355, 382. 
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dence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judici-
ary.52 
In considering applications alleging a breach of article 10, the court has 
developed a standard framework of analysis. The court ascertains 
whether there has been an interference with the article 10(1) freedom of 
expression. It has found that virtually any prohibition or punishment of 
expression constitutes an interference with the freedom of expression.53 
Once the court finds such interference, it applies a three-part test under 
article 10(2) to determine whether the interference is permissible. In or-
der to be in compliance with the Convention, the interference must be 
prescribed by law, for one of the enumerated aims, and necessary in a 
democratic society.54 In applying this test, the court affords national au-
thorities a margin of appreciation (i.e., the scope of discretion left to the 
state).55 However, that margin of appreciation has not prevented the court 
from making a full assessment of all of the facts.56 The court must still 
satisfy itself, in light of those facts, that the reasons proffered for the re-
striction are relevant and sufficient to confirm the existence of a pressing 
social need, corresponding to one of the listed aims, and to demonstrate 
that the interference is required to meet and is proportionate to that 
need.57 
Apart from the very narrow category of expression to which article 17 
has been applied, no categorical line is drawn between types of expres-
sion that will or will not be protected from interference by national au-
thorities. The court examines the content of the expression in its broader 
context, including both the form in which it appears and the local situa-
tion to which it pertains.58 In so doing, the court examines a number of 
factors, including the nature of the expression, the position of the 
                                                                                                             
 52. ECHR, supra note 13, art. 10(2). 
 53. See, e.g., Surek v. Turkey (No. 1), 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 355; Jersild v. Denmark, 
298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994); Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986). 
 54. See Surek, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 382; Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20; 
Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26. 
 55. Surek, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 382; Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21; 
Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25. 
 56. Surek, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 382; Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23; 
Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25. 
 57. Surek, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 382; Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23; 
Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25. 
 58. Surek, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 382; Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23; 
Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25. 
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speaker, the target of any criticism, the intended audience, the type of 
publication in which it appears, and the nature of the interference.59 
Where the expression implicates the role of the press as public watch-
dog, is political, or concerns a matter of public interest, the margin of 
appreciation is narrowed.60 When the expression at issue incites violence, 
the authorities will be granted a wider margin of appreciation, indicating 
a greater deference to the judgment of national authorities and effectively 
lessening the degree of international protection afforded the expression.61 
III. THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS 
As noted above, one of the aims pursuant to which restrictions on free-
dom of expression may be imposed is the protection of the rights of oth-
ers. The rights most directly implicated by the types of expression at is-
sue in the relevant controversies described above are freedom from dis-
crimination and freedom of religion. 
A. Freedom from Discrimination 
In Jersild v. Denmark, the Danish government interfered with a jour-
nalist’s freedom of expression by prosecuting and convicting him for 
disseminating the racist expressions of others in a television documen-
tary.62 While recognizing that this interference pursued the legitimate 
aim of protecting the rights of others, the European Court of Human 
Rights found that criminal prosecution was not “necessary in a democ-
ratic society” to achieve that aim, and it thus constituted a violation of 
article 10 of the ECHR.63 
The Danish Prime Minister may have had this case in mind in early 
2006 when he responded to outrage over the Mohammed cartoons by 
reaffirming Denmark’s commitment to a free press.64 However, there are 
a number of important distinctions between the Jersild case and the Dan-
ish cartoon controversy. 
In the course of its analysis in Jersild, the court emphasized several 
key factors: the fact that the applicant was functioning in his capacity as 
a journalist, the context in which the statements were broadcast, and the 
                                                                                                             
 59. Surek, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 382; Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24–25; 
Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25. 
 60. Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22. 
 61. See generally Surek v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 353. 
 62. Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15. 
 63. Id. at 26. 
 64. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Prime Minister of Denmark, Press Conference Opening 
Statement (Feb. 7, 2006), http://www.stm.dk/ (follow “taler” or “speeches” hyperlink in 
the left column). 
368 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:2 
purpose of the documentary.65 With regard to the applicant’s role as a 
member of the press, the court recalled the importance of a free press in a 
democratic society and noted that “[a] significant feature of the present 
case is that the applicant did not make the objectionable statements him-
self but assisted in their dissemination in his capacity of television jour-
nalist responsible for a news programme . . . .”66 In examining the con-
text in which the news program was broadcast, the court disagreed with 
the finding of the Danish courts that there had been no “attempt to coun-
terbalance the extremist views expressed.”67 The court noted that “the 
TV presenter’s introduction and the applicant’s conduct during the inter-
views clearly dissociated him from the persons interviewed,” that Jersild 
had “rebutted some of the racist statements” made, and that, “taken as a 
whole, the filmed portrait surely conveyed the meaning that the racist 
statements were part of a generally anti-social attitude” on the part of the 
extremists.68 
The court ultimately found that the program, viewed as a whole, 
could not objectively have appeared to have as its purpose the propaga-
tion of racist views and ideas. On the contrary, it clearly sought—by 
means of an interview—to expose, analyse and explain this particular 
group of youths, limited and frustrated by their social situation, with 
criminal records and violent attitudes, thus dealing with specific aspects 
of a matter that already then was of great public concern.69 
In relying on the facts that the news item at issue did not have as its 
purpose the promotion of racial discrimination and that Jersild had pro-
vided a degree of balance to the racist statements made—statements that 
the court noted would be unprotected by article 1070—the court left open 
the possibility that governmental restraints may be justifiably imposed 
when the press simply acts as a mouthpiece for the dissemination of rac-
ist views.71 
                                                                                                             
 65. Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 25. See also Lagoutte, supra note 2, at 398. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 24. 
 70. Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (dictum indicating that the scope of ex-
pression to which the court is prepared to apply article 17 may not be limited to the sin-
gular case of Holocaust denial). 
 71. The court emphasized that it was “particularly conscious of the vital importance 
of combating racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations” and affirmed that 
its interpretation was not incompatible with Denmark’s obligations under the CERD. Id. 
at 22. 
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B. Freedom of Religion 
The European Court of Human Rights has also had the opportunity to 
examine freedom of expression in relation to religious freedom. The 
court has described the latter freedom in similarly lofty terms, finding the 
freedom of religion to be not only “one of the foundations of a ‘democ-
ratic society,’” but also “one of the most vital elements that go to make 
up the identity of believers and their conception of life.”72 
There are a variety of ways in which freedom of expression and free-
dom of religion may interact. A state might enact laws that permit, pro-
hibit, or require expression that conflicts with religious tenets or that cre-
ates an environment that otherwise inhibits religious practices. In Kokki-
nakis v. Greece, the court held that a state may legitimately consider it 
necessary to take measures aimed at repressing certain forms of conduct, 
including the imparting of information and ideas judged incompatible 
with respect for the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion of oth-
ers.73 
However, much of the court’s jurisprudence on the interaction of these 
rights has centered on the “protection of religious feelings,” which the 
court has found to be a component of the freedom of religion.74 The court 
has invoked the aim of protecting religious feelings in a string of cases 
concerning blasphemy laws. 
In Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, handed down the day after Jer-
sild, the court found no violation in the forfeiture and seizure of a film 
that the Austrian government deemed to be “an attack on the Christian 
religion.”75 The court found the seizure to be “necessary in a democratic 
society” to achieve, inter alia, the legitimate aim of protecting the rights 
of others.76 It interpreted the latter as including “the right of citizens not 
to be insulted in their religious feelings by the public expression of views 
of other persons.”77 
At the same time, however, the court made clear that the protection of 
religious feelings could not be invoked to justify a ban on all criticism of 
religion. It stated: 
Those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion, ir-
respective of whether they do so as members of a religious majority or 
                                                                                                             
 72. Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17–18 (1994). 
 73. Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1993). 
 74. See, e.g., Otto-Preminger Institut, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17–18; Wingrove 
v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1937, 1957. 
 75. Otto-Preminger Institut, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20. 
 76. Id. at 20–21. 
 77. Id. at 18. 
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a minority, cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism. 
They must tolerate and accept  the denial by others of their religious 
beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their 
faith.78 
In the subsequent case of Wingrove v. The United Kingdom, the court 
again invoked the protection of religious feelings as justifying what 
amounted to a total ban of a video containing content deemed blasphe-
mous under relevant British law.79 The British authorities had determined 
that the video, which portrayed sexual conduct between individuals re-
vered in Christianity, would “outrage the feelings of Christians, who 
would reasonably look upon it as being contemptuous” of fundamental 
religious tenets.80 
The court noted that the purpose of the restriction was to protect 
against the contemptuous treatment of a religious subject that was bound 
to “outrage” Christians and that this goal “undoubtedly corresponds to 
that of the protection of ‘the rights of others.’”81 It concluded this was 
“fully consonant with the aim of the protections afforded . . . to religious 
freedom.”82 
In assessing whether the ban was “necessary in a democratic society,” 
the court began by noting that “a wider margin of appreciation is gener-
ally available to the Contracting States when regulating freedom of ex-
pression in relation to matters liable to offend intimate personal convic-
tions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion,” indicating the 
broad discretion it would afford the state in this matter.83 The court rea-
soned that  
State authorities are in principle in a better position than the interna-
tional judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these require-
ments with regard to the rights of others as well as on the “necessity” of 
a “restriction” intended to protect from such material those whose 
deepest feelings and convictions would be seriously offended.84   
However, the court also made clear that there remained limits to that 
discretion, and that European supervision was “all the more necessary 
given the breadth and open-endedness of the notion of blasphemy and 
the risks of arbitrary or excessive interferences with freedom of expres-
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. at 17–18. 
 79. Wingrove, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1960. 
 80. Id. at 1947–49. 
 81. Id. at 1955. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1958. 
 84. Id. at 1957–58. 
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sion under the guise of action taken against allegedly blasphemous mate-
rial.”85 In ultimately finding the ban justified, the court relied on several 
factors that may indicate limits on the state’s discretion: whether it was a 
total prohibition, whether it was content neutral, and whether there were 
safeguards against its arbitrary application.86 
In applying these criteria to the facts of the case before it, the court 
emphasized that the relevant domestic law did not “prohibit the expres-
sion, in any form, of views hostile to the Christian religion.”87 The law 
sought only to control the manner in which the views were advocated, as 
opposed to the content of the views themselves.88 Further, the primary 
“safeguard against arbitrariness” identified by the court was the “high 
degree of profanation that must be attained” in order for expression to 
constitute blasphemy.89 The court noted that the extent of insult to reli-
gious feelings must be significant, referring to the domestic courts’ use 
“of the adjectives ‘contemptuous’, ‘reviling’, ‘scurrilous’, [and] ‘ludi-
crous’ to depict material of a sufficient degree of offensiveness.”90 
The court adopted a similar approach in the more recent case I.A. v. 
Turkey, in which it found a criminal prosecution for blasphemy to be 
consistent with article 10.91 In particular, the court found that Turkey was 
justified in imposing a fine on the author of a book for his “abusive at-
tack on the Prophet of Islam,”92 noting that believers might legitimately 
have felt themselves “to be the object of unwarranted and offensive at-
tacks” by some of the book’s passages.93 
In each of these cases, the European Court of Human Rights found the 
suppression of expression justified in order to protect the religious free-
dom of others. In particular, the states had imposed restrictions directed 
toward the protection of the religious feelings of adherents to the major-
ity religion in each state. To the extent that these restrictions are 
grounded in the protection of the rights of others, as opposed to, for ex-
                                                                                                             
 85. Id. 
    86.  Id. 
 87. Id. at 1958. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. I.A. v. Turkey, App. No. 42571/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), http://cmiskp. 
echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=786558&portal=hbkm&source=
externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2007). 
 92. Id. ¶ 29. 
 93. Id. 
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ample, the prevention of disorder,94 they would seem even more justified 
for the protection of religious minorities, who are generally more vulner-
able. 
The jurisprudence of the court makes clear that the freedom of expres-
sion cannot be invoked to allow the creation or perpetuation of a dis-
criminatory environment or one that inhibits the exercise of freedom of 
religion. At the same time, its tendency to find blasphemy laws consis-
tent with the ECHR indicates that the court may have lost its sense of the 
balance between these freedoms. Indeed, at times it seems as though the 
court is permitting the suppression of expression without any showing 
that the rights of others were actually or even potentially infringed. For 
example, in the cases described above, the court did not endeavor to 
demonstrate a clear link between the protection of religious feelings and 
the exercise of freedom of religion—a link that may be particularly tenu-
ous when the feelings of a dominant majority are at issue. 
Restrictions on expression serve human rights principles when they are 
applied to protect a vulnerable group from discrimination or to protect 
the ability of its members to practice their religion. Blasphemy laws that 
serve only to prevent expression deemed offensive by a majority popula-
tion are less defensible. From a human rights perspective, this is one of 
the fundamental problems with blasphemy laws; they tend to focus on 
protection of the group’s feelings, and as such are concerned with how 
that group may respond to the expression at issue. The more important 
inquiry for the purposes of human rights law is how the expression af-
fects the attitude of others vis-à-vis that group.95 Does it incite discrimi-
nation against members of that group? Does it create a social environ-
ment in which members of that group are unable to practice their relig-
ion? Indeed, some of the court’s more recent judgments indicate that the 
court may be backing away from the level of protection accorded to reli-
gious feelings in the absence of some more tangible interference with 
religious freedom.96 The Human Rights Council, on the other hand, 
                                                                                                             
 94. The prevention of disorder has also been invoked as a justification for suppression 
of expression under blasphemy laws. Indeed, in Otto-Preminger, the court noted that 
“[i]n seizing the film, the Austrian authorities acted to ensure religious peace in that re-
gion.” Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 20–21 (1994). 
This approach, however, seems to disserve human rights by enabling the anger of the 
majority to limit the rights of a minority. 
 95. Distinguish the mere depiction of Mohammed, which is liable to offend some 
Muslims, from the depiction of Mohammed in a manner that incites discrimination 
against Muslims, e.g., by inviting the viewer to associate Islam with terrorism and Mus-
lims with violence. 
 96. See Gieniwski v. France, App. No. 64016/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), http://cmiskp. 
echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=791924&portal=hbkm&source=
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seems to have picked up where the European Court of Human Rights left 
off and has taken the protection of religious feelings a step further. 
IV. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL APPROACH—COMBATING 
DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS 
Since its creation in the spring of 2006, the Human Rights Council has 
taken a keen interest in the issue of defamation of religions. During its 
inaugural session in June 2006, the council requested that two of its Spe-
cial Rapporteurs report on the issue at its next session.97 The decision to 
request the report was taken against the backdrop of the Danish cartoon 
controversy and was led by council members that are also members of 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (“OIC”).98 The decision was 
opposed by twelve members of the Council who, as a group, were pre-
dominantly representatives of Western countries.99 
A similar voting pattern was evident in March 2007 when the council 
adopted Resolution 4/9 on “Combating Defamation of Religions.”100 
This resolution was introduced by Pakistan on behalf of the OIC.101 The 
resolution conceives of defamation of religions as a lynchpin human 
rights issue. Its preamble “[n]ot[es] with concern that defamation of re-
ligions is among the causes of social disharmony and leads to violations 
of human rights.”102 
While many of its provisions are couched in general terms applicable 
to all religions, the resolution focuses primarily on defamation of Islam. 
Thus, in an apparent reference to the Danish cartoon controversy, the 
council “deplores the use of the print, audio-visual and electronic media, 
                                                                                                             
externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (last visited 
May 14, 2008) (conviction for religious defamation found to violate article 10); Klein v. 
Slovakia, App. No. 72208/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
view.asp?action=html&documentId=809920&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumb
er&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (last visited May 14, 2008) 
(conviction for religious defamation found to violate article 10). 
 97. See U.N. Human Rights Council Decision 1/107, Incitement to Racial and Reli-
gious Hatred and the Promotion of Tolerance, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/1/107 (Nov. 13, 
2006) [hereinafter Human Rights Council Decision]. 
 98. Id. See also Organization of the Islamic Conference, www.oic-oci.org/oicnew/ 
member_states.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). 
 99. Human Rights Council Decision, supra note 97. 
 100. Human Rights Council Resolution, supra note 10. On the voting pattern, see U.N. 
Human Rights Council, Summary Record of the 31st Meeting ¶ 73, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/4/SR.31 (Sept. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Human Rights Council 31st Meeting]. See 
also U.N. Human Rights Council, Summary Record of the 24th Meeting ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/1/SR.24 (July 18 2006). 
 101. Human Rights Council 31st Meeting, supra note 100, ¶ 60. 
 102. Human Rights Council Resolution, supra note 10, pmbl. 
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including the Internet, and any other means to incite acts of violence, 
xenophobia or related intolerance and discrimination towards Islam or 
any other religion.”103 Similarly, the council expressed “deep concern at 
attempts to identify Islam with terrorism, violence and human rights vio-
lations”104 and noted with “deep concern the intensification of the cam-
paign of defamation of religions, and the ethnic and religious profiling of 
Muslim minorities, in the aftermath of the tragic events of 11 September 
2001.”105 It also requested the United Nations (“U.N.”) Special Rappor-
teur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xeno-
phobia and Related Intolerance “report on all manifestations of defama-
tion of religions and in particular on the serious implications of Islamo-
phobia on the enjoyment of all rights.”106 
The council’s singular preoccupation with Islamophobia becomes more 
acute in light of the fact that efforts to include protection of other specifi-
cally identified religions were blocked by supporters of the resolution. At 
the same time, the singling out of a particular religion for special atten-
tion is not necessarily problematic to the extent it is necessary to address 
issues particular to that religion.107 
Far more problematic is the resolution’s overall tendency to conceive 
of defamation of religions as a human rights violation or as a discrete 
evil on par with human rights violations. Certainly some expressions that 
could be characterized as religious defamation could also constitute hu-
man rights violations, but not so every defamatory expression. A human 
rights issue arises when the expression incites discrimination against 
members of that religion or when it otherwise interferes with their reli-
gious freedom.108 It is not the mere fact that the expression is defamatory 
that makes it a human rights issue. 
The fact that religious defamation is not itself a human rights issue is 
implicit in the way in which the resolution recalls the freedom of expres-
sion. In paragraph 10, the council: 
Emphasizes that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which 
should be exercised with responsibility and may therefore be subject to 
limitations as provided by law and necessary for respect of the rights or 
                                                                                                             
 103. Id. ¶ 11. See also id. ¶¶ 2, 3, 5, and 12. 
 104. Id. ¶ 2. 
 105. Id. ¶ 3. 
 106. Id. ¶12. 
 107. The international law of nondiscrimination recognizes that special positive meas-
ures are at times required in order to ensure substantive equality. See, e.g., CERD, supra 
note 19, arts. 1(4), 2(2). 
   108.  See supra Section III.B. 
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reputations of others,  protection of national security or of public order, 
public health or morals and respect for religions and beliefs.109 
Significantly, “respect for religion and beliefs” is included as an addi-
tional aim pursuant to which restrictions on the freedom of expression 
may be justified.110 This language does not appear in the limitation 
clauses of any human rights treaties.111 The fact that it is listed separately 
from the “rights or reputations of others” implies that it could serve as an 
independent basis for limiting the freedom of expression.112 
The inclusion of this phrase is troubling because it could be read to li-
cense broad-based and wide-ranging blasphemy laws. By including the 
aim of respect for religion and beliefs without a nexus to types of expres-
sion that in fact infringe upon the rights of others, the resolution opens 
the door to proscriptions encompassing any criticism of religion. This 
interpretation is all the more feasible in light of the final preambular 
paragraph, in which the Council “[n]ot[es] with deep concern the in-
creasing trend in recent years of statements attacking religions, Islam and 
Muslims in particular, in human rights forums,”113 and it is all the more 
threatening to a proper understanding of freedom of expression in coun-
tries where the power of the state is closely tied to religious authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The battle lines are still being drawn. Tehran holds a conference that 
focuses on questioning the existence of the Holocaust114 and the U.N. 
General Assembly, in a resolution introduced by the United States, 
“[c]ondemns without any reservation any denial of the Holocaust.”115 In 
the September 2007 session of the Human Rights Council, Pakistan 
warned against revision of the Human Rights Committee’s General 
Comment on article 20, fearing that Western influence in the committee 
                                                                                                             
 109. Human Rights Council Resolution, supra note 10, ¶ 10 (emphasis in original). 
 110. Id. 
 111. It should also be noted that in paragraph 7, the council “[u]rges States to take 
resolute action to prohibit the dissemination, including through political institutions and 
organizations, of racist and xenophobic ideas and material aimed at any religion or its 
followers that constitute incitement to racial and religious hatred, hostility or violence,” 
in language that sweeps more broadly than article 20(2) of the ICCPR. See id. ¶ 7; 
ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 20(2). 
   112.  Id. ¶ 10. 
 113. Human Rights Council Resolution, supra note 10, pmbl. 
 114. Holocaust Meeting Stirs Passions, BBC NEWS, Dec. 13, 2006, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6175353.stm. 
 115. G.A. Res. 61/255 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/255 (Jan. 26, 2007). 
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would lead to a narrowing of the types of expression required to be sup-
pressed.116 
In early 2008, after Danish authorities uncovered a plot to kill the illus-
trator of one of the more controversial cartoons, newspapers throughout 
Denmark reprinted the cartoons, citing as justification the defense of the 
freedom of expression.117 At the same time, a member of the Dutch par-
liament released a controversial film associating recent terrorist violence 
with Islam.118 These developments fueled a divisive debate in the March 
2008 session of the Human Rights Council, which led to a modification 
of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression.119 
The draft of this resolution, initially introduced by Canada, renewed the 
mandate of the Special Rapporteur.120 Over the protest of the Canadian 
delegate, as well as objections by a number of other, mostly Western, 
countries that had initially sponsored the resolution, the mandate was 
amended to include reporting on “instances where the abuse of the right 
of freedom of expression constitutes an act of racial or religious dis-
crimination.”121 Decrying the amendment as seriously undermining the 
                                                                                                             
 116. U.N. Human Rights Council, Summary Record of the 3rd Meeting ¶ 39, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/6/SR.3 (Sept. 25, 2007). 
 117.  Danish Cartoons ‘Plotters’ Held, BBC NEWS, Feb. 12, 2008, http://news.bbc. 
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 119.  U.N. Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, 
Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Develop-
ment ¶¶ 4(a)–(e), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/L.24 (Mar. 20, 2008). 
 120.  Id. 
   121. U.N. Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, 
Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Develop-
ment ¶ 4C-bis, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/L.39 (Mar. 20, 2008). Council members voting in 
favor of the Egyptian amendment were: Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cameroon, 
China, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Madagascar, Malaysia, 
Mali, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, the Russian Federation, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Zambia. Those voting against were: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Guatemala, India, Italy, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United 
Kingdom and Uruguay. Bolivia, Japan, and South Korea abstained. After the adopion of 
the Egyptian amendment, Cuba then introduced an oral amendment that would insert 
language recognizing "the importance for all forms of media to repeat and to deliver in-
formation in a fair and [im]partial manner" into the preambular text of the resolution. 
This amendment too was adopted despite the no-votes of Canada and fourteen other 
council members. Press Release, United Nations, Human Rights Council Extends Man-
dates on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Racism and Racial Discrimination, Soma-
lia and Myanmar (Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huri-
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mandate's focus, a number of countries, led by Canada, withdrew their 
sponsorship of the resolution and abstained from the vote to renew the 
mandate.122 
These recent events reflect the continued entrenchment of both sides of 
the debate;123 neither of these extreme positions capture the complexity 
of the underlying issues. Human rights law provides a framework that 
can accommodate this complexity. 
In assessing the permissibility of restrictions on the freedom of expres-
sion, it is essential to consider the relevant context. In light of the preva-
lence of discrimination against Muslims in many Western countries, in-
vocation of the right to freedom of expression in response to dissemina-
tion of material likely to further incite discrimination loses something of 
its legitimacy and, indeed, its legality.124 While criminal sanctions may 
be unwarranted, there are a variety of other means that may be employed 
by states, including simple condemnation of the expression, explicit at-
tempts to counter the message so disseminated, or the provision of civil 
remedies. 
At the same time, it is important to maintain the grounding of the hu-
man rights framework in human rights principles. For example, the scope 
of protection of freedom of expression, while justifiably limited by the 
human rights of others, should not turn on the propensity for hostility of 
those offended by the expression. The latter is even less justifiable when 
the offended group represents a majority population. 
Of even greater concern is the attempt by the Human Rights Council to 
rhetorically link religious defamation to human rights violations while at 
the same time asserting the former as an independent basis for justifiably 
restricting freedom of expression. At its most nefarious, the resolution 
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 122.  U.N. Press Release, supra note 121. 
 123. See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text (discussing the Swedish govern-
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demnation of religious defamation as a human rights violation). 
 124.  The position of a Muslim in Denmark vis-à-vis the Mohammed cartoons differs 
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could be interpreted to enable states to suppress criticism of the exercise 
of power by a dominant religious majority wholly in the name of defend-
ing human rights. 
There are, of course, innumerable political factors that have influenced 
the decision to create a battle. The purpose of this Article is merely to 
illustrate that this battle results neither from any inadequacy in the 
framework of international human rights law nor from fundamental dis-
agreement over the values underlying human rights law. 
 
